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FIGHTING IN THE PHALANX: THE MORAL NATURE OF THE 
ὉΠΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΤΕΧΝΗ 
L di Campobianco (University of Johannesburg) 
These pages wish to offer a brief reflection on an aspect of the 
process of professionalization that Greek warfare underwent from 
the end of the fifth century BC onward (all dates hereafter BC).  
The analysis will focus on the content and nature of the τέχνη that 
the Greek hoplite ought to acquire to become a χειροτέχνης — an 
expert artisan in massed combat.1 The intention is to explore whether 
this τέχνη could be understood not as technical proficiency in a 
certain military skill that the hoplite acquires bypractice but as a 
choice he is trained to make between εὐταξία and ἀταξία. These 
terms, usually understood in a technical acceptation as ‘order / 
discipline’ and ‘disorder / insubordination’, will be presented here as 
frames of mind [ἤθη τῆς ψυχῆς] and discussed in the light of Plato’s 
use of the terms εὐψυχία and κακοψυχία as hallmarks of the good 
and bad hoplite.  
Introduction 
[…] so how can you pick up a shield — or any other w apon or instrument 
of war — and immediately be equipped to take your place in the battle-line, 
[ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη] or in any of the other sorts of fighting which occur in time 
of war? Think of other instruments: there isn’t one of them that will turn a 
person into a craftsman or athlete simply by being picked up or that will be 
of any use to him if he has no expertise [ἐπιστήµη] or has not had enough 
practice in handling it. 
 Pl. Rep. 2.374dl-612 
Plato’s words3 are representative of a discussion, beginning as early as the fifth 
century BC, on the need for Athens to train and deploy a more professional type of 
                                                   
1  As opposed to mass combat (cf. van Wees, 1994:15 n. 7). For χειροτέχνης cf. Xen. Lac. 
As 11.2. 
2  Unless otherwise noted, the translations are of the author. 
3  Socrates is trying here to make a theoretical point, and get Glaucon to agree that the 
military needs to be governed by the principle of specialisation according to natural 
ability, upon which the ideal city is founded. Although the discussion is not on historical 
facts, it is probably informed by the very historical concern the Athenians had about 
their own phalanx, usually regarded as the weakest unit of the army (cf. Plut. Them. 4.3; 
Xen. [Ath. Pol.] 2.1). My choice of starting a discussion on ancient warfare with Plato 
may give raise to perplexities (see Schwartz 2009:18-20), yet the philosopher ought to 
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soldier. The point he is making is clear: the ὅπλα alone are not enough to turn a 
soldier into a hoplite,4 because a specific ἐπιστήµη regarding war is required, as for 
the practice of every other cultural activity. Therefore, there is a certain τέχνη or 
τεχνικὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεµον ἀγωνία5 that soldiers engaging in the ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη 
ought to learn, if they are to fight not just as amateurs but as τεχνῖται of the 
phalanx.6 Contemporary scholarship has studied the different aspects of the 
professionalisation7 of ancient Greek warfare — a gradual process starting in the 
fifth century and reaching an apex in the fourth century, with Philip II’s 
                                                                                                                
have gained some experience in military matters, during the time he served as a guard 
with other Athenian young men (cf. Thuc. 1.105.4; 2.13.6-7 for examples of military 
incidents that could involve the new levees). He may not have undergone a ‘regular 
programme of training’ (Van Wees 2004:94, contra Hornblower 2007:35-36), yet he 
must have become familiar with military operations, with a chance for actual combat (cf. 
Thuc. 4.67.2; 8.92.2). Finally, if we are to accept the tradition related to his time of birth 
(429-427) he is likely to have served in the Athenian army at the very least during the 
final years of the Peloponnesian War (409-404). Therefore, both Plato and his dramatis 
persona Socrates (whose military experience is not in dispute, cf. Pl. Symp. 219e-21b; 
Pl. Lach. 181 b5-c1; Apol. 28e1-4) would appear to be fully competent to discus  
military matters. On Plato as a trustworthy source on military matters, cf. also Anderson 
1984:152. 
4  For a discussion on the origin, development and meaning of the term ὁπλίτης  
see Echeverría 2012:295-303. As I deal with the hoplite in the fifth and fourth centuries, 
the understanding of the term as ‘heavy-armed infantryman’ (cf. Echeverría 2012:313) 
should not be in question. 
5  Pl. Rep. 2.374d 2. 
6  Cf. Xen. Lac. 13.5, where as an echo of Plato the Spartans are add ssed as τεχνῖται in 
what Plato has called ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη, whereas the rest of the Greeks are considered at 
best αὐτοσχεδιασταί, i.e. the improvised soldiers whom Plato criticises. The Spartan 
mastery in the hoplitic τέχνη, along with the edge it would have granted in battle, was 
perceived to be so important that tradition had Lycurgus forbid the Spartans to fight 
frequently with the same enemy, so as not to train them unwittingly in hoplite warfare 
(see Plut. Ages. 26.2). However, Plutarch could here be lending greate  nobility to what 
may have been a shrewd Spartan psychological trick: in fact, Spartan diplomacy would 
have been very careful to preserve the awe and reputation surrounding its army by 
carefully avoiding fighting whenever possible (cf. Cartledge 1977:11, n. 3), which of 
course it did. 
7  Namely the creation, in the late fifth and fourth centuries, of ἐπίλεκτοι, full-time  
military élite units whose upkeep was funded by the city-state (see Hunt 2007:144-145 
with bibliography and sources), the passage to a type of conscription based on age 
group, at least for Athens (cf. Christ 2001:416-418), and the introduction of a more 
centralised and formal type of training, such as the Athenian ephebeia, aimed at 
providing specific training in ὁπλοµαχεῖν, τοξεύειν, ἀκοντίζειν, καταπαλτήν ἀφιέναι 
(see Arist. Ath. Pol. 42.3.4-5, Pritchett 1974:208; Van Wees 2004:94). 
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contributions to the field.8 Thus far, scholarship seems to have identified the main 
trait of this process as a steady increase of the soldier’s proficiency in a set of 
military skills,9 brought about by the institution of a formal training program 
managed by a central power that trains and employs him as a professional 
throughout the year. My aim in this article is to reconsider the main sources for this 
period regarding the content and nature of the τέχνη that specifically pertains to 
what Plato calls the ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη, the τέχνη required to effectively fight within a 
phalanx. My intent is to explore whether this τέχνη, and the military 
professionalisation which it represents, could be understood, with limited reference 
to the phalanx, not as the mastery of a certain military skill but rather as the 
acquisition and practice of a certain mental disposition, an ἦθος τῆς ψυχῆς, into 
which the professional hoplite is trained. 
The τέχνη of the phalanx: Hand-to-hand combat, τάξις and εὐψυχία 
As has been noted,10 unlike Roman military training,11 proficiency in hand-to-hand 
combat would not seem to be a suitable candidate for the content of this τέχνη. The 
available source material shows that the basics of fighting, understood either as 
striking an opponent, or defending oneself, is something that belongs to the realm 
of φύσις, and therefore opposite to that of τέχνη. As we read in Xenophon: 
[…] We have been initiated into a method of fighting [at close quarters], 
which, I observe, all men naturally [φύσις] understand, just as in case of 
other creatures each understands some method of fighting which it has not 
learned from any other source than from instinct [φύσις] ... [The animals] 
all know how to protect themselves, too, against tha from which they most 
need protection, and that, too, though they have ner gone to school to any 
teacher [διδάσκαλος].   
 Xen. Cyr. 2.3.912 
As fighting is inborn [ἐµπεφυκός] in men and seen as an instinctual reflex, like 
walking or running, its rudiments do not need to be taught or learnt: 
                                                   
8  Sustained by the wealth coming from the Macedonian mines and his continuous 
successful conquests, Philip was in fact able to ‘maintain his army on a full-time 
professional basis, so that they both campaigned an trained hard year round’  
(Hunt 2007:145-6; cf. Dem. 8.11; 18.235). 
9  Skills that differ in accordance to the type of unit where the soldier is deployed  
(Hunt 2007:133). 
10  Anderson 1991:28; Van Wees 2004:91; Hunt 2007:133. 
11  Veg. Epit. 1.11-12. 
12  Miller 1960. 
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[…] Even when I was a little fellow, I used to seiz a sword wherever I saw 
one, although, I declare, I had never learned, except from instinct [παρὰ τῆς 
φύσεως] even how to take hold of a sword […] And, by Zeus, I used to 
hack with a sword everything that I could without being caught at it. For it 
was not only instinctive, like walking and running, but I thought it was fun 
in addition to its being natural [ἠδύ πρὸ τῶι πεφυκέναι]. 
 Xen. Cyr. 2.3.1013 
Spear and sword are almost extensions of the soldier’s body, like an animal’s claws 
or horns.14 Moreover, fighting at close quarters makes missing the target virtually 
impossible15 and the emphasis is usually on the bravery showed by the soldier as he 
interlocks with the enemy, rather than on the skill he displays while he fights.16 
Since hand-to-hand combat was not considered part of military τέχνη,17  
the ability to keep the battle formation of the phalanx [τάξις]18 seems the next best 
                                                   
13  Miller 1960. 
14  On the contrary, the use of ‘non-natural’ weapons such as the bow and the javelin 
requires the acquisition of a specific skill and its practice; cf. Xen. Cyr. 2.1.16: ‘Now, up 
to this time you have been bowmen and throwers of javelins, and so have we; and if you 
were not quite our equals in the use of these arms, there is nothing surprising about that; 
for you had not the leisure to practice with them that we had’. The same goes for 
horsemanship, which required training in learning the hree basic skills of ‘mounting 
quickly, riding in formation, wielding the sword orspear and throwing the javelin from 
horseback’ (Hunt 2007:134; cf. Van Wees 2004:93). Athenian riders were trained in 
these skills also through the ἀνθιππασία, a sham fight on horseback featuring charge and 
retreat (cf. Xen. Eq. mag. 3.11). 
15  Xen. Cyr. 2.1.16: ‘We must strike those opposed to us at such close range that we need 
not fear to miss our aim when we strike’. A close echo of these words may be found in 
Anderson 1970:84.  
16  Xen. Cyr. 2.3.11, stating that hand-to-hand combat ‘demands courage (προθυµία) more 
than proficiency (τέχνη)’. Cf. also Plut. Apophthegmata Laconica 241f, for the reply 
‘add a step to it’ given by a Spartan mother to a sn complaining about the short length 
of the Spartan ξίφος. 
17  One may object that by the end of the 5th and throughout the 4th century ὁπλοµάχοι 
would seem to be in high demand as private instructo s of ‘hoplite fighting’ (Hunt 2007: 
133-134), teaching ‘taktika, that is, weapons handling, individual and unit drill’ (Hunt 
2007:214, quoting Aen. Tact. 3.4). However, Plato presents them mainly in relation to 
individual combat, and often in a negative light. He dismisses the usefulness of their 
teaching in a phalanx (contra Cawkwell 1989:378) by having Nicias say that ‘the 
greatest advantage of this training will be felt when the ranks are broken’ (Pl. Lach. 
182a7; cf. Anderson 1991:30), and Laches remark that if there were anything useful in 
their art ‘it would not have been overlooked by theSpartans’ (Pl. Leg. 182e 6-7; cf. also 
Pl. Lach. 183d-184a on the ὁπλοµάχος Stesileos, cf. Schwartz 2009:94-95). On the other 
hand, a passage from Xenophon (Lac. 11.8) points to the ὁπλοµάχοι as teachers in τάξις, 
cf. Wheeler 1983:13-18. 
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candidate. Modern scholarship and relevant sources a knowledge its importance to 
the phalanx: ‘an army in disorder [ἄτακτος] is a confused mass, an easy prey to 
enemies […] and utterly useless [ἀχρηστότατον]’ says Xenophon,19 choosing a 
term later on used by Aristotle as he defines as ἄχρηστος a phalanx whose τάξις 
has been lost.20 However, despite the consensus on τάξις as a key element for the 
phalanx, no fifth or fourth century BC sources engaging in the debate on warfare 
describe drills specially designed to train the soldiers in this skill.21 Likewise, they 
do not express any concern about their absence nor do they suggest their adoption. 
Plato seems to concern himself with formation-drills when he states that the 
legislator should institute ‘field operations’ for the army, one of a ‘minor kind’ to 
be held daily and without the ὅπλα,22 and one of a ‘major kind’, to be held once 
every month in full armour, constituting sham battles where soldiers will be ...  
[…] contending with one another in the capturing of f rts [κατάληψις 
χωρίων] and in ambuscades [ἐνέδρα] and in all forms of mimic warfare;  
in fact, they shall do literal fighting with balls and darts as nearly real as 
possible, although the points of the darts shall be made less dangerous,  
                                                                                                                
18  From Thucydides onward, the term takes the specific meaning of ‘battle formation’  
(cf. Wheeler 2007:192; Echeverría 2012:308-310). 
19  Xen. Oec. 8.4. Cf. also Xen. Eq. Mag. 2.7 on the importance of τάξις in the deployment 
of the cavalry.  
20  Arist. Pol. 4.1297b19-20. Xenophon’s remarks are likely to derive from his  
personal expertise in the field, and are evidently confirmed for earlier events: when 
hoplites are deployed ἀτάκτως and without κόσµος heavy losses are to be expected  
(cf. Thuc. 3.108.3, where the Peloponnesians retreat in ἀταξία suffering heavy losses, 
with the exception of the Mantineans ‘who kept their ranks best of any in the army 
during the retreat’), especially when they fight against a tightly ordered phalanx  
(cf. Xen. Hell. 7.1.16-17, where the fight is between hoplites ἀσύντακτοι and those 
συντεταγµένοι, with the former meeting a bitter end). On the contrary, a tightening of 
the formation can save a phalanx and prevent losses, even when in dire situations  
(cf. Thuc. 1.63.1). Aristotle will further theorise Xenophon’s position by placing  
the τάξις at the heart of the hoplite fighting, to the extent that if the notion of it  
is altogether missing in warfare, then so is the notio  of the phalanx itself (Pol. 
4.1297b20-2). 
21  According to Van Wees, the Spartan army would have been trained in some formation-
drills when engaged in a military campaign (see Van Wees 2004:92), yet Xenophon 
makes no mention of these exercises. Therefore, even if the Spartans did actually  
train to maintain their skills in τάξις, Xenophon’s silence about it, coupled with his 
interest in noting instead their care for physical fitness, would offer an even clearer 
insight on the priority of the latter over the former. 
22  Probably this type of training was aimed mainly at conditioning the body, as the 
reference to χοροί and γυµναστική (Leg. 830d5-6) would suggest. Plato also suggests 
military tournaments [µάχαι ἑορταστικαί] be performed once a month (see Pl. Leg. 
8.829c). 
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in order that their game of combat may not be completely devoid of fear 
[ὅπως µὴ παντάπασιν ἄφοβος γίγνηται], but may provide terrors [δείµατα] 
and indicate to some extent who is strong-hearted [εὔψυχος] and who not. 
To the former the lawgiver shall duly assign honours, to the latter demerit 
[…]  
 Pl. Leg. 8.830e1-1223 
In line with military tradition, Plato would, then, suggest the use of sham battles as 
a preparation for war. Nevertheless, to read this passage as a yearning for a more 
specialised phalanx group-training, probably as a result of the on-going process of 
military professionalisation,24 would seem to go beyond the author’s intentions. 
Plato highlights two situations, the taking of a fortress and the laying of an ambush, 
that have little to do with the phalanx. Sham field battles aimed at training soldiers 
in τάξις are de facto omitted, their importance apparently downplayed. Moreover, 
to gain a better understanding of the passage we need to set the key terms used  
by Plato — δείµατα, ἄφοβος, εὔψυχος — into their proper interpretative frame. 
While discussing a few chapters earlier how infants should be reared, Plato points 
out that fear [δείµατα] is to be considered as ‘a poor condition of the soul’  
(Pl. Leg. 7.790e9), and that an infant’s soul which is left within its grip ‘will be 
specially liable to become timid: and this ...  is not to practise courage, but 
cowardice’ (Pl. Leg. 7.791b4-7). The remedy he proposes is simple: every soul 
should practise courage ‘from youth up’ (Pl. Leg. 7.791b10), slowly acquiring 
what he calls an ἐπιτήδευµα τῆς ἀνδρείας, a habit of courage, which he further 
defines as ‘the conquering of the frights [δείµατα] and fears [φόβοι] that assail us’ 
(Pl. Leg. 7.791c1). Finally, Plato sets this habit and the cherfulness that derives 
from it as requisites for the soul to gain a condition of εὐψυχία, the ‘proper’ or 
‘right’ disposition, the very purpose of the education and the opposite of 
κακοψυχία,25 its negative counterpart to which cowardice leads nd that is to be 
avoided. 
If we set the key terms of Leg. 8.830d-e in the interpretative frame set by 
Plato’s remarks on education, the main impression is that the purpose of the sham 
battles is not to make the soldier more skilled but simply more courageous. To this 
end, Plato stresses that the key to the success of this training is the recreation of an 
experience that is ‘as nearly real as possible’ to that of a real battle, precisely 
because he wishes the soldier to become familiar with the δείµατα and φόβοι that 
                                                   
23  Bury 1967. 
24  Van Wees 2004:90.  
25  Pl. Leg. 7.791c8-10.  
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come with it,26 and gradually to learn how to bear them. His proficiency in warfare 
as well as his body, which is already subjected to aily training, may incidentally 
benefit from this practice. However, it is his ψυχή that really concerns Plato, what 
he wishes to train and induce into that ἐπιτήδευµα τῆς ἀνδρείας that he mentions at 
Leg. 7.791c1, the condition he has set to gain εὐψυχία. Aristotle seems to echo 
Plato’s words on courage as a habit to be maintained through practice.27 While 
neglecting any exercise aimed at practising τάξις, he will also make a stronger case 
for physical education as a means to acquire it. In his discussion on the upbringing 
of youth, he states that physical exercise should be taught not only because of its 
benefits to the body, but also because by working o the body a certain ἦθος τῆς 
ψυχῆς would be established: 
[…] Since it is plain that education should be carried on first with habits 
[ἦθος] rather than by reasoning [λόγος], and by training the body [σῶµα] 
before the mind [διάνοια], it is clear from these considerations that the boys 
must be handed over to the care of physical exercise [γυµναστική] and to 
the art of gymnastic [παιδοτριβική]; of these, the former realizes a certain 
condition of the body [ἕξις τοῦ σώµατος], while the latter provides training 
for the performing of certain movements [ἔργα].  
 Arist. Pol. 8.1338b 4-8 







↓↑                                                   ↓↑ 
Condition of the body 




                                                   
26  For the panic, fear and other gruesome aspects that the Greek hoplite may have 
experienced during the battle, and the importance of morale to win them, cf. Lazenby 
1991:91-96; 104-106. 
27  Arist. Eth. Nic 1104b1-3 ‘[…] and the same [as temperance] with courage: we become 
brave by training ourselves to despise and endure ter ors [τὰ φοβερά], and we shall be 
best able to endure terrors when we have become brav ’. 
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Like τέχνη, ἦθος stands on the opposite side of φύσις as it conveys the idea 
of something that cannot be gained naturally.28 Like τέχνη, one needs to practise it 
after its acquisition in order to maintain it, carrying out actions that bear its mark 
and foster its development.29 From this perspective, the body is trained as the seat
of the ἦθος itself, the concrete place where we may experience and understand its 
dynamics, attaining it through its actual practice and gradual realisation. In 
conclusion, it is true that ‘we pursue gymnastic for the sake of strength and 
health’,30 Yet the training of the body ought to be regarded ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς 
ἀνδρείαν,31 as an activity whose ἔργα lead the soul to acquire the ἦθος of courage.32 
Returning to history, it is only around the time city-states began to raise 
permanent professional élite units33 that we may find in our sources a more explicit 
reflection on τάξις, alongside the traditional appreciation for physical fitness in the 
hoplite34 which we may now interpret through Plato and Aristotle as a mark of 
courage. Xenophon, who offers a definition of τάξις as the ability of ‘to carry on 
the fighting anyway, with any troops at hand, even in case the line gets into 
confusion,’35 presents the only available descriptions of a sham field battle (Xen. 
Cyr. 2.3.17-20) and of a formation-drill (Xen. Cyr. 2.3.21-22). However, the sham 
field battle cannot be taken as evidence for τάξις training, since no phalanx is 
                                                   
28  Arist. Eth. Nic. 1103a 18-19: ‘and from this is clear that none of the moral virtues 
appears inherent to us by nature [φύσις]’. 
29  In this respect, says Aristotle, moral virtues such as courage are much like crafts or arts, 
for ἃ […] µαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες µανθάνοµεν (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1103a 32). 
30  Arist. Pol. 8.1338a 19-20. 
31  Arist. Pol. 8.1337b 27. 
32  Aristotle’s examination of ‘courage’ as a virtue is clearly more complex, yet for the 
purpose of the discussion one does not need to proceed. For an analysis of the 
Aristotelian virtue of courage cf. Sanford 2010:440-444; also Van Wees 2004:193. 
33  Without taking into consideration the case of the Spartan ἱππεῖς (see Lazenby  
1985:10-12), the existence of military élite troops in Greek city-states may be traced 
back as early as 461, namely the chosen Six Hundred at Syracuse (cf. Diod. 11.76.2; 
Wheeler 2007:220), and to Thucydides’ mention of a unit of 1000 Argives, trained at the 
state’s expense (Thuc. 5.67.1). However, it is not clear whether they were true 
professionals, that is tanding units undergoing a full-year training at the expense of the 
state, or just ‘picked [λογάδες] men in an amateur army’ (Hunt 2007:144, with sources), 
chosen for their physical excellence as was the caswith the 300 picked Athenian men 
(see Plut. Arist. 114). Limiting the discussion to mainland Greece, it may perhaps be 
safer to consider the Theban Sacred Band, established in 379, as the first professional 
élite military unit, followed right away by the Arcadian ἐπάριτοι (371) maintained with 
funds from the sanctuary of Olympia (cf. Xen. Hell. 7.4.33; Roy 2002:317, n. 29). 
34  Xen. Hell. 3.4.16, where prizes are offered to the division of h plites that has ἄριστα 
σωµάτων, whereas the other units — cavalry, archers, javelin-throwers — receive a 
prize in relation to their skills.  
35  Xen. Lac. 11.7. 
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involved.36 Instead, Cyrus’ interest is piqued by the obedience displayed by the 
soldiers during the exercise, and by the cheerfulness [εὐθυµία] they found in it.37  
In Xen. Cyr. 2.3.21-22 we find the description of two types of frmation 
movements, one of which (2.3.22) is explicitly said to be rehearsed ‘in case it 
became necessary to lead the men away from the enemy’, i.e. in case of retreat. 
Xenophon may be describing here a practice of the Spartan army, which he takes 
as a model for the army Cyrus is organising.38 If this is the case, it is interesting to 
note that Cyrus does not rejoice in the τάξις displayed by the soldiers in their 
manoeuvres per se. In fact, the spotlight is rather on the skills of their commander; 
he commands his troops with πρᾳότης, yet he is obeyed,39 and he receives praise 
for ἐπιµέλεια as he devised an exercise the purpose of which is to ‘get [the 
soldiers] into the habit [ἐθίζω] of obeying just the same, whether they follow or 
whether they lead’ (2.3.22). In both cases the main aim of the training is to induce 
the soldiers into the habit of following orders and ot to enhance their skill in 
formation. As Xenophon says, while discussing the reasons behind the Spartan 
military superiority, learning how to organise and maintain a τάξις properly, 
however key to it, is not, to use a modern phrase, rocket science: 
It is so easy to learn this formation [τάξις] that no man who knows how to 
distinguish a man from another can possibly fail. For leadership is granted 
to some, others are [sc. simply] ordered to follow. The deployments are 
verbally announced by the captain as if by a herald […]. The battle-lines are 
then drawn up thinner or deeper. Nothing whatever of these movements is 
difficult to learn. 
 Xen. Lac. 11.640 
For τάξις to be realised on the battlefield soldiers only need to follow orders, not 
necessarily to understand them. Therefore, the problems begin when the orders are 
not carried out, that is when amateur soldiers are not accustomed to the discipline 
                                                   
36  As Xenophon stresses, Cyrus is particularly pleased because ‘that side was victorious 
which was armed after the fashion of the Persians’ (Xen. Cyr. 2.3.19), whereas the 
losing side was armed with clay projectiles. 
37  ‘Cyrus admired both the captain’s cleverness and the men’s obedience, and he was 
pleased to see that they were at the same time having their practice and find it a reason 
for cheerfulness [ηὐθυµοῦντο]’ (Xen. Cyr. 2.3.19). Cheerfulness of the soldiers as a 
result of the training is stressed again in Xen. Cyr. 2.3.20. 
38  Van Wees 2004:186, Christesen 2006:55-56, Wheeler 2007:207, n. 86. 
39  Xen. Oec. 21.4-5 where the author discusses the differences between the good and the 
bad leader. Xenophon would identify the good leader mainly by his quality of inspiring 
amongst the troops a natural disposition to obedience of which the key feature is again 
its cheerful nature [οὐκ ἀθύµως]. 
40  Lipka 2002. 
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established by the στρατιωτικὸς βίος.41 Still, the term ἐθίζω used by Xenophon 
shows that discipline and obedience to orders cannot be considered — and in fact 
are never presented — as skills. They are habits, ἤθη. This is why Xenophon 
portrays a Cyrus eager to appoint contests for soldiers aimed not at training their 
hand-to-hand combat or their proficiency in τάξις, but in what 
[…] He knew it was important for soldiers to practise […] to the private 
soldier, that he shows himself obedient to the officers, ready for hardship, 
eager for danger but subject to good discipline [εὐταξία], familiar with the 
duties required of a soldier, neat in the care of his equipment, and ambitious 
about all such matters ...   
 Xen. Cyr. 2.1.2242 
Seen from the Aristotelian perspective discussed before, the training set by these 
contests may be considered as a way to induce into the trainee the ἤθη he needs to 
acquire in order to become a professional soldier: obedience, willingness to endure 
physical strain and bravery tempered by discipline,43 but also care for the 
equipment while in camp, and an overall familiarity with, and acceptance of, the 
duties requested of a soldier in a professional army. Thus, what Xenophon presents 
is again a practice aimed at training the ψυχή of the soldier, not his skills. This may 
explain why the author seems so keen on emphasising cheerfulness as the mood a 
leader should try to infuse into his troops. On this note, although links between 
Plato and Xenophon are elusive at best44 one cannot but remark on their agreement 
on the key role played in warfare by the psychological dynamic of morale, which 
Plato has set at the basis of his εὐψυχία. 
Markers in a linguistic field: ἀταξία and εὐταξία 
The sources considered thus far seem to support the choice of identifying  
the content of the τέχνη mentioned by Plato as a mental disposition, an ἦθος τῆς 
ψυχῆς, the acquisition and practice of which separates th  τεχνίτης of the phalanx 
                                                   
41  Arist. Pol. 2.1270a 4-6. On the problems and ways of keeping the discipline in 
‘amateur’ armies cf. Van Wees 2004:108-113; Hunt 2007:131-132.   
42  Miller 1960. 
43  Perhaps Xenophon is echoing Arist. Eth. Nic. 2.2: ‘the man who runs away from 
everything in fear and never endures anything becoms a coward; the man who  
fears nothing whatsoever but encounters everything becomes rash’, cf. also Arist.  
Eth. Nic. 2.7-8.   
44  Danzig 2005:332-334 considering the case of the two Symposia. 
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from its αὐτοσχεδιαστής.45 According to Plato, this disposition is that of εὐψυχία, 
whereas its opposite κακοψυχία marks the souls of the amateur. However,  
both terms need to be further clarified, for even if Plato points towards courage and 
cheerfulness as the requisites of the former and cowardice and gloominess as 
marks of the latter, this simple sum does not seem capable of exhausting the 
meaning of the two terms. Insights may thus come from setting Plato’s theoretical 
contribution on warfare in its historical context, and exploring if authors preceding 
Plato have already conveyed the opposition nestled within the antithesis between 
the two words, although in different terms. 
A well-known passage from Thucydides introduces a couple of opposites 
that seems to serve a similar purpose, i.e. to distinguish the amateurs from what he 
calls the ‘artisans of war’: 
 
[…] It was their lack of discipline [ἀταξία] that had done the mischief.  
They had not, however, been so much inferior as might have been expected, 
especially as they had been pitted against troops who ere the foremost 
among the Hellenes in experience, simple beginners [ἰδιῶται] so to speak, 
against skilled craftsmen [χειροτέχναι]. What had also done great mischief 
was […] the confused disorganisation [ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχία] of many 
[soldiers]. If only […] during this winter they should get the hoplite-force 
ready, providing arms [ὅπλα] for those who had none […] and enforcing  
the general training, in all likelihood, he said, they would get the better of 
the enemy, if to courage [ἀνδρεία], which they had already, discipline 
[εὐταξία] were added to when it came to action. 
 Thuc. 6.72.3-446 
Elected στρατηγός alongside Heracleides and Sicanius,47 the Syracusan Hermo-
crates is analysing the causes of the defeat suffered at the hands of the Athenians.48 
                                                   
45  This observation is very much in line with Xenophn’s remarks on the souls of the 
soldiers as the crucial factor that determines the outcome of a battle (cf. Xen. Cyr. 
3.3.19; Anab. 3.1.42; cf. also Polyb. fr. 58 B-W). 
46  Smith 1966. However, the translation of the syntagm ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχία as confused 
disorganisation is mine. 
47  Cf. Thuc. 6.73.1-2; Diod. 13.4.1. 
48  Thucydides, probably acquainted with Hermocrates (cf. Fauber 2001:40), introduces 
him as someone who has gained unparalleled competence a d valour in war  
through a first-hand experience of the battlefield (see Thuc. 6.72.2). However, if the 
main source for Thucydides’ reconstruction of Hermocrates’ deeds is indeed 
Hermocrates himself, then some dramatic reconstruction may be effecting the  
narrative, at least to a certain degree. Although Hermocrates’ known involvement 
occurred after the siege of Syracuse, the use of the article before πόλεµος may  
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As he stresses twice, the problem does not lie with a want of courage, rather  
with the different quality of their army compared to the Athenians’. Although 
theirs is an ἦθος of ἀνδρεία, the majority of the Syracusan are ἰδιῶται, 
inexperienced in the ways of war, whereas fifteen yars of war have made the 
Athenians experienced χειροτέχναι, ‘artisans’ of warfare. Hermocrates has already 
pointed out49 the lack of military ἐπιστήµη and the resulting ἦθος that characterise 
the Syracusan;50 here, he refers to their inexperience and amateurism through  
the term ἀταξία, describing its consequence on the battlefield with the  
expression ἡ ἀξύντακτος ἀναρχία — a vivid portrait of the confusion within  
the ranks resulting from soldiers deployed incompetently51 and under too many  
commanders. On the other side of the same linguistic field,52 its antonym εὐταξία 
characterises the Athenians as χειροτέχναι, soldiers whose experience in war  
has earned them the corresponding τέχνη, ideally making them εὔψυχοι. 
Hermocrates wants the Syracusan soldiers to acquire εὐταξία so that they  
may level the playing field with the Athenians. To this end, he suggests that the 
whole Syracusan army become professional, i.e. the supplying of ὅπλα at the 
                                                                                                                
suggest that ‘his experience and courage may have been of much longer standing  
than the fighting with Athens’ (Gomme, Andrewes & Dover 1970:348). Recent 
scholarship has in fact re-evaluated his military brilliance regardless of the poor  
results achieved by Syracuse under his leadership (see Bloedow 1993:118-120). 
Therefore, we can consider the Syracusan general as  soldier that knows his trade, a 
professional well versed in the ‘Platonic’ τέχνη of hoplite combat. 
49  Cf. Thuc. 6.69.1. However, Thucydides’ account could be influenced by Hermocrates, 
who would be stressing the lack of experience of his fellow-citizens to heighten  
the dramatic conclusion of the battle. 
50  Hermocrates gives credit to the Syracusan for thei  προθυµία and τόλµη, yet the two 
terms sketch a contradictory portrait of the army’s ψυχή. While προθυµία is usually 
endowed with a positive meaning, τόλµα is more of an ambiguous word, often used  
in a negative connotation to convey the idea of ‘reckl ssness’, antithetic to that of 
ἀνδρεία. In Plato, the term is in hendiadys with entirely negative terms (cf. Pl. Lac. 
197b4, with θρασύτης; cf. Pl. Ap. 38d7, with ἀναισχυντία), and Aristotle uses the 
adjective τολµηρόν to refer to an action that is ‘daring’ and not courageous because 
driven by the wrong impulse: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1117a1-3, the impulse here being ‘lust’ 
[ἐπιθυµία]).  
51  According to the narration of the battle given by Thucydides, the Syracusan ἀταξία 
would have started even before the engagement, as some of the Syracusan soldiers 
would have abandoned their ranks to visit their families, taking their places with no 
rationale just before the battle, ‘here and there in the main body, as they joined it’ (Thuc. 
6.69.1). 
52  I am here referring to the linguistic notion of a semantic or lexical field, which ‘denotes 
a segment of reality symbolized by a set of related words’ (Brinton 2000:112). 
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expense of the city and the institution of a formal and probably demanding53 
military training, devised to prepare the whole army εἰς τὸ ὁπλιτικόν.  
On the account of Hermocrates’ analysis, it should be safe to accept εὐταξία and 
ἀταξία as the two key terms used by Thucydides to define professionalisation and 
amateurism in Greek warfare. Unlike Thucydides, Plato will continue to use these 
terms mainly in an ethical sense,54 opting for the couple εὐψυχία — κακοψυχία to 
convey the opposition denoting possession or lack of what he identifies as the 
content of the τέχνη in the ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη: 
 
 τέχνη in ὁπλιτικὴ µάχη 





 ↓ ↓ 
Thucydides εὐταξία ἀταξία 
↓ ↓ ↓ 
Plato εὐψυχία κακοψυχία 
 
But what do these terms mean? The term εὐταξία is generally translated as the  
sum of its parts, therefore as a τάξις = ‘battle formation’ that is somehow  
εὐ- = ‘appropriate’ or ‘effective’ for phalanx combat, and by extension as the 
‘discipline’ that is required to keep it. As a result, εὐταξία is usually understood as 
a noun that denotes the artful keeping of phalanx in a tight yet neat formation  
so as to strengthen its cohesion, implicitly acknowledged as the key condition for 
its efficiency.55 However, this interpretation is not entirely satisfying for two 
                                                   
53  Tim. FGrH 566, f100a–c, where we read that the Spartan general Gylippos would  
have become extremely unpopular among the Syracusan precisely due to his attempts to 
impose a tight Spartan-like professional discipline o  the soldiers. 
54  Cf. for instance the platonic inspired Def. 411d8-9, where εὐταξία is defined as “a 
harmony of the soul’s parts with one another”. What emerges from these sources is that 
τάξις, wherever applied, concerns the arrangement and effective cooperation of complex 
entities constituted form parts. 
55  Salmon 1977:90 envisages a fighting unit able to always keep its cohesion despite its 
large size; Snodgrass 1993:55 speaks of a thick yet orderly formation; Wheeler 
2007:204 mentions the need of ensuring ‘the close integrity of the phalanx’s ranks and 
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reasons: First, it leads towards the understanding of εὐταξία as a skill that is 
connected to the Platonic εὐψυχία, which is clearly a state or a condition of the 
soul, and, second, the relationship that the English and Greek positive terms have 
with their antonyms would suggest something different — cohesion and close 
order are clarified and further defined in their meaning by their antonyms  
inconsistency / disintegration and disorder / anarchy,56 but the concepts they 
denote are not entirely equivalent to that which is conveyed by the antonym 
ἀταξία. In fact, the use that our sources make of it in a military context shows  
that the term cannot always be translated by using the English antonyms disorder 
or insubordination.57 For example, in defending himself from the accusation of 
being too harsh with his soldiers, Xenophon claims to resort to physical 
punishments only in specific situations: 
[…] I admit, soldiers, that I have indeed struck men because of their ἀταξία, 
the men who were content to be kept safe by you whomarched in good 
τάξις and fought wherever there was need, while they themselves would 
leave the τάξις and run on ahead in the desire to secure plunder and to enjoy 
an advantage over you. For if all of us had behaved in this way, all of us 
alike would have perished.   
 Xen.  An. 5.8.1358 
Although the action of abandoning the ranks may cause disorder in the τάξις,  
the disarray feels here more of a consequence, an outcome produced by what 
Xenophon conveys through the term ἀταξία. Therefore, the object of the 
punishment is neither the disorder per se, nor the act of insubordination that may 
cause it, but rather the selfish, individualistic attitude shown by some soldiers who 
contravene the orders and undermine the cohesion of the phalanx for personal 
gain.59 The psychological nuances embedded in ἀταξία are hardly a novelty to be 
credited to Xenophon, as they can be already appreciated in Thucydides’ use of the 
term: for instance, as soon as the Athenians 
                                                                                                                
files’ and Schwartz 2009:195-198 stresses the importance of maintaining a cohesive 
formation at all times. 
56  See Fergusson 1986:73 s.v. open; 79 s.v. cohesion; 295 s.v. order. 
57  Two meanings that the term ἀταξία may still retain. However, its use in hendiadys such 
as ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία (cf. Pl. Cri. 53d 3-4) or ἀµαθία καὶ ἀταξία (Cf. Xen. [Ath.]  
Pol. 1.5.4) suggests that the term has always been endowed with a moral or ethical 
sense. 
58  Brownson 1961. 
59  A frequent situation in Xenophon’s experience, f. Xen. An. 4.3.30; 5.4.16, 20; 5.7.13-7. 
Cf. also a similar situation in Thuc. 7.13.2. 
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[…] dashed forward in great ἀταξία, as if they had already won [ὡς 
κεκρατηκότων] […] The Boeotians made the first stand against them, 
attacked them, routed them, and put them to flight. 
 Thuc. 7.43.760 
Here Thucydides uses ἀταξία to suggest the image of a sudden disorder within the 
Athenian ranks, yet the disarray is again the result of an equally disordered mental 
state in which the soldiers have stepped, seduced this time not by gain but by a 
false sense of hope and security.61 Something similar may happen when the mind of 
the soldier is troubled by the opposite feeling — that of despair. Thucydides 
presents Gylippos addressing his army before the attack: as he describes the 
situation of the Athenians, he says that: 
[…] the excess of their sufferings and the necessiti  of their present 
distress have made them desperate; they have no confidence in their force, 
but wish to try their fortune in the only way they can […]  
 Thuc. 7.67.462 
Thucydides notes that the current circumstances have brought the Athenians ἐς 
ἀπόνοιαν — to the point that they are beginning to lose the grip on their own minds 
— but a few lines later he has Gylippos refer to this condition by using the term 
ἀταξία (7.68.1). This instance exceeds the usual interpretation and understanding 
of the term as ‘disorder in the formation’ or ‘insubordination’, as it is clearly used 
with reference to a mental state. Therefore, by using 7.68.1 as an interpretative key, 
an alternative reading of the other instances could be proposed: in Thuc. 5.6.10 the 
Athenians are said to be πεφοβηµένοι, stricken by fear, and are for this reason 
affected by ἀταξία, and as a consequence they fall into confusion and let their 
formation end in disarray. Likewise, in Thuc. 7.43.7, they act ὡς κεκρατηκότες, 
under the influence of an excessive confidence that c uses ἀταξία, the 
consequences of which are again an act of insubordination that causes their 
formation to shatter. Strictly speaking, disorder or insubordination are not ἀταξία 
but rather its possible outcomes. The term would seem, then, to refer to a dynamic 
degenerative process that begins when a strong emotion infects the mind of the 
soldier and gradually takes hold of him, until it becomes his definitive state. The 
meaning of the positive term εὐταξία should emerge along similar lines, and could 
be understood as a dynamic mental process of opposite nature and outcomes. 
                                                   
60  Smith 1965. 
61  In Aristotle’s own words, here the Athenians would not be ἀνδρεῖοι but merely 
θαρραλέοι, because ‘they think they are stronger than the enemy, and not likely to come 
to any harm’ (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1117a).  
62  Smith 1965. 
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When engaged in it, a soldier would ideally remain capable of maintaining his self-
control, no matter what δείµατα and φόβοι he goes through. 
In conclusion, the acquisition of the terms εὐταξία and ἀταξία to the lexical 
field of war, and the development of their meaning, seem to reflect the on-going 
debate on military professionalism in the fifth and fourth centuries. Starting with 
Thucydides,63 these terms seemingly begin to stand for two contrasting behaviours 
on the battlefield, the opposition of which mirrors and realises that between the 
χειροτέχνης and the amateur of war. Later on, Xenophon receives th se terms from 
Thucydides in their new specialised meaning, yet begins to expand their 
understanding by projecting them onto a broader philosophical frame of 
interpretation. Plato stands at the end, if not aside, of this process of redefinition: 
by entrusting the expression of the opposition receiv d from Thucydides to the 
couple εὐψυχία — κακοψυχία, he centres the spotlight directly onto the 
psychological dynamics that produce the two behaviours. Now read as ἦθη τῆς 
ψυχῆς, the trait of ‘discipline’ / ‘order in formation’ [εὐταξία] and ‘indiscipline’ / 
‘disorder in formation’ [ἀταξία] could be seen as the manifestations of these 
psychological dynamics, in Aristotelian terms their distinctive ἔργα. As a result, 
the perception that authors of the fifth and fourth century seem to have of the τέχνη 
required to fight within the phalanx does not appear to revolve solely around a 
skill, but also around an ethical64 crossroads that leads to two opposite mental 
states. Thus, to fight professionally becomes to make  choice between two 
irreconcilable ἤθη, which the hoplite has to face dynamically, at every step of the 
battle. 
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